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According to Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus announced during the election campaign of the 
133 BCE, that he would pass a number of laws, and among them — the law granting the right 
of appeal to the people (provocatio) ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν. Ti. Gracchus has died before he passed 
the alleged law. Besides Plutarch, his last reform programme is attested only by Cassius Dio, 
who mentions no law on appeal. The whole programme is very similar to the laws of Gaius 
Gracchus, and there is suspicion, that it consists of the laws of Gaius which were ascribed to 
Tiberius to depict him as a power-seeking demagogue. What could be the aims of the law on 
appeal and what it meant exactly? Firstly, both Gracchi could consider an appeal against the 
senatorial extraordinary commissions which would protect the Gracchans against political 
persecution. This measure seems to be more appropriate after the advocates of Tiberius Grac-
chus were prosecuted in senatorial courts. But Gaius Gracchus, instead of it, prohibited ap-
pointing the extraordinary courts iniussu populi. Secondly, if the aim was to gain the electors, 
Tiberius could promise them appeal against murder courts, though it would be pernicious for 
the public order. Finally, in all other cases the bill on appeal would be of no use for the Grac-
chans, but would make them a good target of criticism. Such a measure could well be invented 
by an anti-Gracchan source. 
Keywords: provocatio ad populum, Gaius Gracchus, Tiberius Gracchus. 
Provocatio — an appeal to the Roman people — has long been a matter of debate. 
Th. Mommsen saw it as part of any comitial trial which he regarded as “zweistufiges mag-
istratisch-komiziales Verfahren”, where provocatio might be allowed in cases of iudicatio. 
The iudicatio was for Th. Mommsen some sort of judicial verdict by a magistrate. This 
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scheme can be deduced from some theoretical notes of our sources,1 but it is difficult to 
apply it to the majority of both the comitial courts and the precedents of provocatio. For 
in the most comitial trials no appeal is attested, and the most cases of appeal concern not 
iudicatio, but coercitio — the penalties which a magistrate could impose without any trial 
for the benefit of public order.2 On this fact is based the alternative view, namely that that 
provocatio was not required for a comitial court, and that it was possible against coercitio.3
A curious instance of an attempt to introduce provocatio as a means of challenging 
court rulings can be found in Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16, 1: describing the tribunal elections of 
the summer of 133 BCE, in the course of which Tiberius Gracchus attempted a re-election 
and, according to Plutarch and Cassius Dio (24, Frg. 83 (Dindorf) = 84 (Boissevain) 7–8), 
put forward a number of reforms. Before we get down to the discussion of the law on prov-
ocatio itself, it is worthwhile to cite both testimonies about the election programme and to 
assess their reliability, Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16, 1:4
(1)᾿Επεὶ δὲ συνορῶντες οἱ φίλοι τὰς ἀπειλὰς5 καὶ τὴν σύστασιν ᾤοντο δεῖν ἑτέρας περιέχεσθαι 
δημαρχίας εἰς τὸ μέλλον, αὖθις ἄλλοις νόμοις ἀνελάμβανε τὸ πλῆθος, (2) τοῦ τε χρόνου τῶν 
στρατειῶν ἀφαιρῶν, (3) καὶ διδοὺς ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, (4) καὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι 
τότε συγκλητικοῖς οὖσι καταμειγνὺς ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων τὸν ἴσον ἀριθμόν, (5) καὶ πάντα τρόπον 
ἤδη τῆς βουλῆς τὴν ἰσχὺν κολούων6 πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονικίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ 
συμφέροντος λογισμόν. 
“(1) And now his friends, observing the threats and the hostile combination against him, thought 
that he ought to be made tribune again for the following year. Once more, therefore, Tiberius 
sought to win the favour of the multitude (plebs?) by fresh laws, (2) reducing the time of military 
service, (3) granting appeal to the people from the verdicts of the judges, (4) adding to the judges, 
who at that time were composed of senators only, an equal number from the equestrian order, 
(5) and in every way at length trying to maim the power of the senate from motives of anger and 
contentiousness rather than from calculations of justice and public good.”7 
Cassius Dio 24, frg. 83 (Dindorf) = 84 (Boissevain), 7–8: 
(2) <…> ὁ Γράκχος τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἐκ τοῦ ὁμίλου νόμους τινὰς ἐπικουροῦντας ἔγραφε, 
(4) καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱππέας μετῆγε, (1+5) φύρων καὶ ταράσσων πάντα 
τὰ καθεστηκότα, ὅπως ἔκ γε τούτου ἀσφαλείας τινὸς ἐπιλάβηται. καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα 
αὐτῷ προεχώρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ’ ἐξόδῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦν καὶ ἔμελλεν ἀπαλλαγεὶς αὐτῆς αὐτίκα τοῖς 
1 E. g. Pompon. Dig. 1, 2, 2, 16; Cic. De Leg. 3, 6 and 27. See Mommsen 1899, 166–167; 31887, 138, 1; 167, 1. 
2 The only exception is the court of duumviri perduellionis, where provocatio is well attested (Liv. 1, 26, 
5–14; Cass. Dio 37, 25, 4–28, 4). There were attempts to refute the evidence because of an alleged contradic-
tion between it and Cic. Rab. Perd. 12. See Kuznetsova 2017. 
3 Mommsen’s views (albeit compressed) can be gathered from Mommsen 1899, 151–174; 31887, 162–
169. For objections, see Bleicken 1959. Lintott 1972, 226–227 gives a brief abstract of the polemic. This 
might be enough to understand the essential points. 
4 For the purposes of clarity, we split the text into passages numbered in round brackets. 
5 Plutarch seems to be neglecting the threats of prosecution Tiberius could face once he stepped down 
as tribunus plebis; Cassius Dio mentions these in the passage cited, as does Appian (B. Civ. 1, 13, 57). In what 
is above, Plutarch is dealing with the outrage Tiberius encountered in connection with the will of Attalus 
and renunciation of Octavius; it is possible that ἀπειλαί imply a real danger, not verbal abuse.
6 Cf. Plut. C. Gracch. 5, 1 about C. Gracchus: Τῶν δὲ νόμων, οὓς εἰσέφερε τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενος καὶ 
καταλύων τὴν σύγκλητον, ὁ μὲν ἦν…
7 Transl. Perrin 1988. 
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ἐχθροῖς ὑποβληθήσεσθαι, ἐπεχείρησε καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐπιὸν ἔτος μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ δημαρχῆσαι καὶ τὸν 
πενθερὸν ὕπατον ἀποδεῖξαι, μηδὲν μήτ’ εἰπεῖν μήθ’ ὑποσχέσθαι τισὶν ὀκνῶν. 
“(2) <…> Gracchus was proposing certain laws for the benefit of those of the populace serving 
in the army, (4) and was transferring the courts from the senate to the knights, (1+5) disturbing 
and overturning all established customs in order that he might be enabled to lay hold on safety in 
some wise. And when not even this proved of advantage to him, but his term of office was draw-
ing to a close, when he would be immediately exposed to the attacks of his enemies, he attempted 
to secure the tribuneship for the following year also, in company with his brother, and to appoint 
his father-in-law consul; and to obtain this end he did not hesitate to make any statement or 
promise anything whatsoever to people. Often, too, he put on mourning and brought his mother 
and children into the presence of the populace to join their entreaties to his.”8 
The evidence for the last reform programme of Tiberius Gracchus is slim: the law on 
provocatio is mentioned only in Plutarch;9 both attest to the law on the reduction of the 
term of military service and on lists of jury courts which are unattested in the rest of our 
extant sources.10 The relevant passage in Appian, one of the main sources on the life of 
Tiberius Gracchus, does not say a word about these laws (B. Civ. 1, 14, 58–17, 72). 
Cassius Dio seems to be locating these drafts in the time prior to the election cam-
paign. Both he and Plutarch can speak of the laws, which Tiberius has put in action. But 
Plutarch associates these drafts with the time of the election campaign. He could just as 
well imply not the reforms carried out, but an election programme. Such explanation is 
more feasible: there is no evidence either for the application of these laws, or for their 
revocation, while the law on the transferring of the courts to equestrians was passed only 
by Gaius Gracchus. Thus we suppose that both Plutarch and Cassius Dio speak of the elec-
tion programme of Tiberius Gracchus which probably remained unimplemented. 
What catches the eye here is the similarity this programme bears to the laws introduced 
later by Gaius Gracchus: lex Sempronia militaris of 123 BCE differs from the draft of Tibe-
rius, but both may be considered to be moving in the same direction;11 one can only regret 
the loss of the details of the Gaius Gracchus’ law concerning the lists of jury courts in Cassius 
Dio, but in Plutarch — our only source describing the relevant drafts of both brothers — the 
8 Transl. Cary 1989. 
9 Rotondi 1912, 300 suggests a comparison between Plutarch’s testimony and Macr. Sat. 3, 14, 6 Eys-
senhardt, or else with the law on the makeup of court commissions. Both comparisons are unlikely, see the 
next note.
10 Macrob. Sat. 3, 14, 6 Eyssenhardt mentions the speech of Scipio Aemilianus contra legem iudicia-
riam Tib. Gracchi. Meyer 21842, 191–192 refers this testimony to a bill on the makeup of law courts and con-
cludes that it was voted down thanks to the efforts of Scipio. Rotondi 1912, 300 accepts this point. But Scipio 
was in Numantia during the whole tribuneship of Tiberius Gracchus (Münzer 1900, 1456; Schulten 1936, 
1260). Thus, this speech could only refer to a law, which was in force after Tiberius’ death. It could be the 
law granting the triumviri agrarii the power to decide on the legal status of contested plots of land (Roton-
di 1912, 300 (lex Sempronia agraria altera); for a detailed discussion see Lapyrenok 2016, 36–52 [Р. В. Лапы-
ренок. Наследие аграрного закона Тиберия Гракха : земельный вопрос и политическая борьба в Риме 
20 -х гг. II в. до н. э.]. As a result of the efforts of Scipio these powers were transferred on to the consul of 
129 BCE. C. Sempronius Tuditanus (Broughton 1951, 504), which makes it plausible that the speech dates to 
that very year. Holding to this point are Malcovati 1930, 1, 120–121; Gabba 1958, 60–61; Münzer 1900, 1457. 
11 Is mentioned in Plutarch G. Gracch. 5, 1; Diod. 34/35, 25. It is possible that this law was meant by 
Asconius In Cornel. 54 Stangl to be among the laws revoked by M. Iunius Silanus. See Marshall 1985, 242. 
We owe this prompt to V. K. Khrustalev. 
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essence of their proposals is the same.12 As well in other sources: Velleius Paterculus (2, 2, 
3)13 ascribes to Tiberius Gracchus the initiative of Gaius to grant citizenship to Italics.14 It 
looks like as if some laws of Gaius were ascribed to Tiberius. Anyway, bills which were not 
passed as laws, could have easily been distorted already in the ancient tradition. Whatever 
was the source of Plutarch and Cassius Dio, their censorious tone makes an impression that 
this was a source hostile to the Gracchi, trying to ascribe to Tiberius certain radical pro-
posals that could have served as a justification of his murder. All this makes the evidence of 
Plutarch and Cassius Dio suspicious.15 But it can not be simply refuted. Certain discrepan-
cies between the sources as well as the silence of Appian concerning these laws do not imply, 
that the laws were invented after Tiberius’ death.16 And it would be unwarranted to say, that 
the laws could not be conceived by Tiberius because they are too similar to the laws of his 
brother or because the evidence reflects an anti-Gracchan source. 
If the Plutarchs’s source invented the bill on provocatio, it is natural to think, that the 
invention was based on some project of Gaius Gracchus, the same way as the rest part of 
the election programme.17 The bill on provocatio could have been conceived and left un-
fulfilled by both brothers as well as their advocates. Our task is to work out to which ends 
the law on provocatio could have served them.18 Chronologically, we are working between 
133 BCE, the year Tiberius was voted tribunus plebis, and 122 BCE, the death of Gaius. 
Which procedure could be implied in the Gracchan bill on appeal? The tradition 
gives no detailed account of the procedure, which was needed in case of provocatio. Its re-
construction depends on one’s understanding of provocatio. For Th. Mommsen provocatio 
12 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16, 1 et C. Gracch. 5, 2–3. See Fraccaro 1914, 154–155, who notes, that the descrip-
tion by Cassius Dio is identical with Liv. Epit. 60 (on Gaius’ law). Fraccaro’s hypothesis that the Tiberius’ bill 
on provocatio might reflect an earlier version of the same judicial law of Gaius, is puzzling. It is based on the 
assumption, the Tiberius’ bill on appeal might be designed on behalf of the equestrian order, namely to give 
them protection in repetundarum cases; Fraccaro seems to suppose the same for the judicial law of Gaius. 
Cf. further, n. 37. 
13 Rotondi 1912, 300 wrongly points to App. B. Civ. 1, 23, 98–100 as a mention of this bill of Tiberius 
Gracchus; in fact, it refers to Gaius Gracchus. Lange 31879, 685 points to App. B. Civ. 1, 21, 86–87, in fact, 
describing the events of 125 BCE (rogation of consul Fulvius Flaccus, see Rotondi 1912, 306). 
14 On this bill, see various suggestions of: Münzer 1923a, 1392; Gabba 1958, 79–80; Sherwin-White 
21973, 139–149; Stockton 1979, 185–195. The relevant sources: Vell. Pat. 2, 6, 2; Plut. G. Gracch. 5, 2; App. B 
Civ. 1, 23, 98–10. This bill has never been passed law.
15 See criticism of Fraccaro 1914, 145–161, especially 154–160. Part of his argumentation resting on 
a psychological portrait of Tiberius drawn by Appian cannot, in our opinion, be verified; to counter his 
argument that consistent policy aiming at segregation of senators and equestrians belongs to Gaius and is 
impossible for Tiberius (op. cit. 159–160), one may object that the latter, feeling the danger, could seek sup-
port of all strata of society. 
16 Münzer 1923b, 1419–1420 on these grounds accepts the quoted testimonies of Plutarch and Cassius 
Dio. Stockton 1979, 72–74 observes, that it is impossible either to corroborate or to refute them, and suggests 
(ibid. 68, n. 26) that this programme may be a part of a sweeping reform project, conceived by Tiberius shortly 
before his death. Mommsen 1899, 476 accepts Plutarch’s note on the bill concerning provocatio; he does not 
discuss the other points of Tiberius’ programme. Lintott 1972, 240: “Whether Plutarch is relating a genuine 
proposal of Ti. Gracchus or one that appeared in his brother’s propaganda, there is nothing essentially implau-
sible in it.” The main reason for this point of view appears to be the hypothesis (ibid., 239–240) that provocatio 
against court rulings was not forbidden by law and was acceptable in the eyes of the Romans. Lintott’s later 
judgement concerning the programme of Tiberius Gracchus (Lintott 1994, 69) is far more careful. 
17 To this we return at the end of the present article.
18 The points of the programme as related by Plutarch and Cassius Dio may come from different 
sources, but they would be worth discussing as a whole. We have to forgo this opportunity and concentrate 
on provocatio which interests us most, while a broader approach would far outreach the proposed study. 
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by definition led to a comitial court.19 But according to J. Bleicken’s point of view, it could 
be a plebiscitum as well.20 
Iudicium populi was a procedure inherently cumbersome and easily disrupted. Cf. 
Cic. De Dom. 45: 
ne improdicta die quis accusetur, ut ter ante magistratus accuset intermissa die quam multam inro-
get aut iudicet, quarta sit accusatio trinum nundinum prodicta die, quo die iudicium sit futurum, 
<…> si qua res illum diem aut auspiciis aut excusatione sustulit, tota causa iudiciumque sublatum 
est.
“To prevent the accusation of anyone without notice being given, but demanding that the magis-
trate shall lay his accusation thrice, with an interval of a day between each accusation, before he 
inflicts a fine or gives his verdict, while the fourth accusation shall convey an intimation that the 
trial will after three (eight-day) weeks from the day on which it is laid; <…> if the day named is 
cancelled by reason of unfavourable auspices or of any other excuse, the whole process and the 
trial itself are also cancelled.”21
If the Gracchan bill prescribed not a trial, but a rogatio on pardoning of the accused, 
the time taken by the procedure would be only a little shorter. Promulgatio was to take 
place within trinum nundinum before the voting. In the 1st c. BCE this period was laid 
down as law (lex Caecilia Didia 98 BCE: e. g. De Dom. 41), and there is no reason to sup-
pose that prior to that it was not done likewise by custom.22 In order to be functional in 
the case of provocatio, a clause specifying a magistrate to file rogation should be written 
19 This can be supported by the vocabulary used in the context of provocatio, though allowing for a 
non-technical interpretation: certare ad populum (e. g. Liv. 1, 26) or iudicium populi (e. g. Liv. 8, 33, 8). As 
for Greek, Dion. Hal. 5, 19, 4 describes provocatio as προκαλεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ δήμου κρίσιν. 
Provocare and appellare in post-classical language are synonymous and imply a court of last resort (e. g. Tac. 
Ann. 14, 28); provocare often means “to take to court” (OLD s. v. 6). 
20 J. Bleicken suggests, that provocatio stemmed from a spontaneous appeal of a plebeian to his com-
rades: if the tribunes of the plebs saw, that their ius auxilii in this case could be ignored, they summoned 
the plebs and demonstrated by means of a plebiscite, that people were ready to defend their comrade. See 
Bleicken 1959, 345–356. The precedents of provocatio against the main pontiff seem not to correspond the 
procedure of the comitial trial. See Bleicken, 1957, 462–468 with the list of the cases ibid. 450–457; and 1959, 
341–345. One should consider, if the description of the cases in the tradition fits the procedure and if the 
described procedure was the formally correct consequence of the provocatio and not a compromise reached 
in an insoluble conflict between the religious norms and the citizen’s right of appeal. I must concede that 
my own quotation of Liv. 40, 42, 9–11 as a iudicium populi (Kuznetsova, 2017, 295–296) is open to doubt. 
Note that Bleicken admits no fixed procedure for provocatio; a plebiscite might be passed sometimes, not 
always, and only before the right of appeal was recognized by the laws. Because, as he argues, the laws on 
appeal had as consequence not the exercise of it, but the fall of the appealable punishment out of use: this 
punishment began to be prescribed only by means of iudicium populi. See Bleicken 1959, 2462–2463. But it’s 
unlikely that the laws ordered a magistrate to repeal the punishment, if it was appealed against. They must 
have prescribed some procedure. And it might be not a voting on a plebiscite: a law ordering to pass another 
law looks quite strange. Lintott 1972, 239–240 suggests a voting on a rogation for the bill of Antonius (Cic. 
Phil. 1, 21–26). As Lintott himself points out, a proposal of pardoning the accused would contradict the 
norm privilegia ne inroganto. 
21 Trans. Watts 1923 with my corrections. Cloud 1994, 501 suggests that the formal procedure de-
scribed by Cicero was not adhered to at all times. He corroborates his cause quoting, without any comment, 
two passages from Livius: Liv. 25, 3 and 43, 16. Cf. Briscoe 2012, 444, who thinks, that Livy (in the latter 
passage) describes the trial in inappropriate way. We suppose rather that Livy simply ignores details not re-
lating to the voting. We see nothing inappropriate in it. In any case, we see no reasons to believe that comitial 
courts could be “speeded up”. The quoted passages of Livy do not imply it.
22 Wesener 1962, 1239–1241. 
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into the Gracchan law. Comitial court is in an advantage of having as default prosecu-
tor the praetor having as a provincia the court which pronounced the sentence appealed 
against to the people. 
In whatever form the people of Rome made a decision in cases of appeal, the proce-
dure might take a lot of time. Any obstacle could have had the acquittal of the accused as 
a consequence, if it was a comitial court.23 And if it was a voting on a proposal, the conse-
quences of an omen could become a matter of a heated discussion: should the convected 
be acquitted or not.24 The more trivial the court case, whose sentence was made eligible 
for a provocatio, the more inconveniences it was likely to breed. Either the court would fall 
out of use, or else provocatio would become futile, no longer an inviolable and sacred right 
of a Roman citizen, but an empty sound. 
What exactly does ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν mean? The following variants are possible: 
— provocatio against a private court appointed by a praetor; 
— provocatio against legis actiones;
— provocatio against a legis actio sacramento in criminal cases;25 
— provocatio against a conviction before a standing commission (quaestio perpe-
tua);26 
— provocatio against a condemnation before an extraordinary commission 
(quaestio extraordinaria); 
— appointed by the popular assembly;
— appointed by the senate.27 
An appeal in any legis actio, as far as we know, has not as yet been suggested; it is 
well worth considering. The introduction of provocatio against legis actiones would mean 
a popular assembly labouring under a burden of issues of trifling importance and a mul-
titude of checks for the party bringing legal action. In particular, that would have grave 
consequences for the business life in Rome.
In civil legis actiones it is difficult to imagine a right for provocatio due to one more 
reason: in the Roman tradition, provocatio is viewed as a safeguard of the liberties of a Ro-
man citizen against the implementation of certain severely grave punishments, while in 
legis actiones the issue at stake was at the most the loss of property, and this not as form of 
punishment, but a necessity to cover the expenses of the opposite party. 
It is easier to conceive a provocatio against legis actio sacramento in a criminal case, 
the existence of which was suggested by W. Kunkel.28 While the laws of the 12 Tables were 
in effect, it could have been possible that severe corporal punishments (talio) and capital 
punishment could well have been imposed, against which provocatio could be used. It is 
however questionable as to whether an introduction of such a provocatio could be attrac-
23 See De Dom. 45 quoted above. Cf. Kuznetsova 2017, 294–296 for some details. 
24 However, such details could be included into Gracchan bill on provocatio. 
25 W. Kunkel conjectured their existence before the introduction of quaestiones perpetuae to substitute 
for the bipartite court with obligatory provocatio suggested by Th. Mommsen. See Kunkel 1962, 97–130; in 
brief: Id. 1963, 728–731. Nobody related ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν to them.
26 Lintott 1972, 240 (cf. further, n. 33) may imply every form of quaestio, but his examples concern 
quaestiones perpetuae. Fraccaro 1914, 154 explains ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν in such a way, but does not accept 
Plutarch’s evidence. 
27 Interpretation of Botsford 1909, 255. 
28 See above, n. 26.
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tive to the general public; it seems to be too disruptive for public order, for the condemna-
tion of the criminal in this case would be complicated.29 
On balance, provocatio against “non-criminal” legis actiones is highly improbable; 
and in “criminal” legis actiones (if they existed) it could be attractive for lower strata, if 
they were not aware of the possible consequences of such a law. In this case the Gracchan 
bill can be explained only as a purely demagogic step. 
The same might be said in the case of quaestio inter sicatios.30 Besides of it, we hear 
of only two quaestiones perpetuae in the 2nd cent. BCE: quaestio repetundarum31 and de 
ambitu.32 The latter is not attested before 121, but suppose all the three existed. A provo-
catio against condemnation repetundarum would play into the hands of the senators. The 
lex Acilia repetundarum33 of the time of Gaius Gracchus allows to bring action against the 
majority of magistrates and the sons of those who are senators at the time of the trial;34 
one can well imagine that an equestrian who went no further in office than aedilis, could 
be put on trial under this law, but mostly it had a bearing on senators. It is questionable, 
however, whether at an earlier date the laws were not somehow different.35 In the majority 
of the attested extortion trials of the 2nd c. BCE the defendants were former provincial 
governors; judging by a number of sources, by the 1st c. BCE it was common practice to 
hold them responsible for the actions of their underlings.36 It is evident that in this case 
29 It’s often suggested that the process before quaestores parricidii included appeal to the people (see 
Wesener 1963, 803–806 (including literature)). The details of this process are unattested. Provocatio is con-
jectured on base of the analogy with the court of duumviri perduellionis, where the appeal is well attested 
(Liv. 1, 26, 5–14; Cass. Dio 37, 25, 4–28, 4), though very much debated (see Kuznetsova 2017). When we 
draw this analogy, provocatio should be the part of both procedures, — but they both would allow no ac-
quittal (Liv. 1, 26, 7: absolvere ne innoxium quidem posse), and this might be the fact, which made an appeal 
indispensable. There was then no resemblance between the court of quaestores parricidii and quaestio de 
sicariis; even if there was an appeal to the people in the former, this makes no easier enacting of the right of 
appeal in the latter.
30 It’s attested for the 141 BCE: Cic. De Or. Fin. 2, 54: (L. Hostilius Tubulus, see Broughton 1951, 475) 
qui cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam ut anno 
proximo P. Scaevola tribunus plebis ferret ad plebem vellentne de ea re quaeri. About the quaestio inter sicarios 
see Kunkel 1962, 45 n. 171 and 1963, 736. The quaestio de veneficiis is first attested for 98 BCE, but could 
have existed before, see Kunkel 1963, 738–739. 
31 Kunkel 1963, 736–737; Rotondi 1912, 292. Cic. Brut. 106 refers to it as the first quaestio perpetua.
32 Alexander, 1990 № 34–36 — the first cases ambitus quoted by him — are all dated 116 BCE, what 
makes the quaestio de ambitu likely to be established not long before. The testimonies quoted by Lintott 
1972, 240, 75 do not attest quaestio (perpetua) de ambitu for the time of Gracchi: the earliest case is Plut. 
Mar. 5; Cic. De Or. Orat. 2, 174 describes the events of 97 BCE (see Leemann et al. 1989, 311), and the quoted 
passages of Livy — leges de ambitu from the first time of the 2nd c. BCE, that is, before the first quaestio 
extraordinaria (149 BCE, cf. Cic. Brut. 106). 
33 We accept the identification of the lex repetundarum tabula Bembina as lex Acilia. See Crawford 
1996, 1, 51–52 and bibliography ibid. 39–40. The text of the lex Acilia is cited according to this edition. 
34 Lex Acil. I. 2. The passage is corrupt: Crawford 1996, 1, 95; Damon, Mackay 1995, 41, n. 17. 
35 Cic. Rab. Post. 12–19  argues, that Rabirius should not be condemned lege Iulia de repetundis 
(59 BCE) even under the clause quo ea pecunia pervenerit: such a precedent would be dangerous for the 
equites, who were not indictable under this law (except for this clause). Concerning the lex Iulia see Klein-
feller 1914, 607–608; Damon, Mackey 1995, 44, n. 30. It seems that no lex repetundarum (at least since the 
Acilian law) infringed on the interests of the equestrian order: only the former magistrates were indictable. 
The situation might have been the same also before the Acilian law. 
36 See Damon, Mackay 1995. Under the cases collected by Alexander 1990  before 76  BCE we are 
aware only of two precedents, which may contradict to their conclusions: № 94, prosecution of a legate, on 
which see Damon, Mackay 1995, 47, n. 42; and № 96, the prosecution of M. Aemilius Scaurus ob legationis 
Asiaticae invidiam under the lex Servilia (Asc. 21 C.; on the Servilian law see Berger 1925b, 2414–2415). 
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the senators would have a vested interest in provocatio. But the Gracchi could not gain the 
majority of the senate by such a law. At best they could gain support of several politicians, 
but it is no less questionable: the condemnation in the extortion court was at this time 
rare.37 This fact makes the appeal dispensable also for the equestrians: if they wanted to 
support the magistrates active on their part in the provinces, they had more convenient 
means (e. g. bribery). 
The second objection is purely of legal character: before the Acilian law the quaestio 
repetundarum was a legis actio sacramento,38 which did not specify any particular punish-
ment — only the the recovery of losses; the Acilian law was the first to specify a penalty, 
namely the restitution of damages in duplum.39 Thus, any provocatio against the sentence 
repetundarum before the Acilian law would be a provocatio against legis actio sacramento 
discussed above.40 
Finally, provocatio in the extortion court would have aggravated the position of the 
provincials and the Italic allies of the Romans alike.41 This would have caused violent 
opposition on the part of the latter, thus granting the senate a strong argument in prop-
aganda. C. Gracchus defended the interests of provincials and allies; there is also some 
not very reliable evidence for Tiberius’ intention to give citizenship to Italics (see above, 
3–4). Would appeal in extortion courts contradict the course of Gracchan politics? This 
depends on whether the agrarian laws of Tiberius (Liv. Per. 58) did hurt the allies. This 
is a matter of debates.42 Anyway, there were heated conflicts between the agrarian com-
mission and the italics. Thus the power to render a judgement on disputed parcels was 
transferred from agrarian triumvirs to the consul of 129 BCE C. Sempronius Tuditanus, 
who neglected the task.43 If the agrarian laws did not offend the allies, the law on appeal in 
extortion courts would do it and would not go with the other Gracchan laws, e. g. lex Acil-
ia repetundarum. If the agrarian laws did, it would be highly unreasonable to exacerbate 
the struggle by the law on provocatio. Thus the law allowing an appeal in extortion courts 
could not be proposed by C. Gracchus and then be ascribed erroneously to Tiberius. And 
it is at least doubtful, that it could be submitted by the latter.
Quaestio de ambitu raises doubts on similar juridical grounds. In the last fifty years of 
the Republic, the earlier the law was passed, the milder was the punishment for bribery: 
lex Pompeia of 52 BCE enforces not only the current punishment, but the court procedure; 
This legatio is mentioned nowhere else. Cf. Marshall 1985, 134–136 for further discussion. Anyway, the most 
people prosecuted repetundarum were senators. Therefore we can’t accept the hypothesis of Fraccaro 1914, 
156–157, cf. 159 that the appeal in extortion courts would be attractive for equites. 
37 Cf. Alexander 1990 № 8, 9, 23; Lintott 1994, 77; Cloud 1994, 507–508. 
38 Lex Acil. 23 neive eum [quei condemnatus siet, quod cum eo lege Calpu]rnia aut lege Iunia sacramento 
actum siet aut quod h(ace) l(ege) nomen [delatum sie]t. Сf. Kunkel 1962, 12–13; Crawford 1996, 1, 101–102. 
39 The exile was not a punishment but a method of avoiding it, cf. further, n. 53. For the penalty both 
in the Acilian law and the earlier laws see Lex Acil. 58–59 (de litibus aestumandis).
40 We are grateful to V. K. Khrustalev for this argument. 
41 That the extortion court could be of interest for the italics, one may conclude from l. Acil. 1 [quoi 
socii no]minisve Latini exterarumve nationum… The text in brackets is conjectured by C. А. C. Klenze (see 
Crawford 1996, 1, 75). 
42 Stockton 1979, 42–46 suggests, that the allies believed erroneously, that their rights were infringed: 
the cause was the misrepresentation of the agrarian law by the senate, For the contrary view cf. Lapyrenok 
2016, 13–52. For him, C. Gracchus tried to compensate the losses of the allies by giving them civic rights 
(Ibid., 52–67; as to the rights of the Roman citizen he seems to take into account only the possession of 
public land; I am not sure, what he thinks of the right of provocatio (ibid., 67)). 
43 Cf. above, n. 10. 
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lex Tullia of 63 BCE adds to the mentioned below a decade of exile; lex Calpurnia Acilia of 
67 BCE requires a life-long ban on running for any office and a fine; the Sullan law only 
suspended the eligibility for any office for ten years.44 One may surmise that before that, 
in the 2nd c., the sentences imposed were even milder. In which case a provocatio against 
them was of no use.45 To this, Polyb. Hist. 6, 56, 4 is an obstacle: 
παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις δῶρα φανερῶς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς, παρὰ δὲ ῾Ρωμαίοις 
θάνατός ἐστι περὶ τοῦτο πρόστιμον. 
“A proof of this46 is that at Carthage candidates for office practice open bribery, whereas at Rome 
death is the penalty for it.”47
The question is what Polybius has in mind. He may refer to a certain law, or to an 
instance of prosecution conducted in an extraordinary court (a quaestio extraordinaria or 
a comitial trial) not necessarily in conformity with some law.48 The problem is that there is 
no evidence for death penalty for bribing voters either in the time of Polybius, or before. I 
have looked in vain for any court de ambitu before 116 BCE. 49 As for the laws, we know of 
two dating before the 2nd c. BCE (Liv. 4, 25 et 7, 15, 12–13), both dubious. They concern 
electioneering, but not bribery, and there is no mention of any penalty in the sources. The 
two laws from the early 2nd c. BCE (Liv. 40, 19, 1150 and Epit. 4751) are only mentioned, 
and there is no evidence on their contents.52 One cannot exclude both that in the times 
of Polybius a certain law did inflict death penalty for bribing of voters and that it could 
form an extraordinary committee of judges. However, it is easier to suppose, that, at least 
in practice, in the 2nd c. BCE death penalty was not imposed for this; any mention of it 
may date back to some point in early history and a practice fallen out of use.53 The idea 
44 Schol. Bob. 78–79 Stangl lists of the laws on electioneering see in Hartmann 1894, 1801; Mommsen 
1899, 873–875. 
45 We are grateful to V. K. Khrustaljev for all the said in this paragraph.
46 I. e. of the fact that the Romans consider an inappropriate profit to be the worst shame. 
47 Trans. Paton 1979. 
48 The discussed passage of Polybius can be understood as concerning not a purchasing of votes but 
some other kind of bribe, but even then we can’t illustrate it with any examples. 
49 The only case, which could be related to ambitus — the investigation of C. Maenius quoted n. 56, — 
has nothing to do with bribing.
50 Et legem de ambitu consules ex auctoritate senatus ad populum tulerunt. See Stolle 1997, 64–65; 
Mommsen 1899, 866, n. 6. 
51 Lex de ambitu lata. The law is mostly referred to as lex Cornelia Fulvia. Both the date (159 BCE) and 
the authorship of the law (the consuls Cn. Cornelius Dolabella and M. Fulvius Nobilior) seem to be generally 
accepted (Berger 1925a, 2344–2345; Broughton 1951, 445; Hartmann 1894, 1801; Lange 31879, 312; Rotondi 
1912, 288 et al.). As far as I can understand, the date is lead from the fact, that the law is mentioned between 
the praetorship of Cn. Tremellius (Broughton 1951, 428) 159 BCE and the census of the same year; this is 
supported by Plinius’ note, that the censors tried to limit the ambitio (NH. 34, 14). See Rinkes 1854, 47–52. 
52 But both laws were linked to the cited passage: Walbank 1957, 741 (doesn’t make choice between 
the two laws)); Hartmann 1894, 1801 votes for 159 BCE;. Lange 31879, 312, 663 and, following him, Rotondi 
1912, 288 conclude from the cited passage of Polybius, that the law of 159 BCE might have toughened up 
the penalty by prescribing a banishment. But θάνατος may mean death penalty, and in Polybius’ time the 
exile was not a punishment, but a method of avoiding it, cf. e. g. Kunkel 1963, 766–768; Kleinfeller 1909, 
1684; Levy 1931, 5–14. 
53 Lintott 1990, 3 (φανερῶς is understood as manifesto, and the law as “directed against the clearly 
attested giving of bribes by the candidate himself ”). Mommsen 1899, 668–669 cites these words of Polybius 
among the sources concerning the three kinds of fraud, for which, in Mommsen’s view, was fixed death 
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of an appeal to the people against condemnation for bribing the same people seems to be 
a good target for criticism. The Gracchi would not gain a lot by promulgating such a law. 
To sum up, it was but useless for the Gracchi to introduce a provocatio on the sentence 
of quaestiones perpetuae. At best it can be explained as a demagogic step, — and only if it 
concerned the quaestio inter sicarios. 
The extraordinary committees were set up to ensure a speedy court procedure. Provo-
catio would have rendered them useless. An extraordinary court could be set up by ruling 
of either the senate or the public assembly.54 In the latter case, a clause excluding an appeal 
could be introduced into the bill setting up the court; in the former case the senate would 
need a separate law. Thus, at first sight, a law on provocatio against the rulings of extraordi-
nary trials could affect the interests of the senate. Before the murder of Tiberius Gracchus 
the senate did decree an extraordinary trial in case of high-profile crimes potentially dis-
rupting the law and order, but not in case of political crimes.55 Hence an introduction of 
provocatio against extraordinary courts was of no evident advantage to Tiberius Gracchus. 
One may proffer a guess that that was his way of safeguarding himself and his advocates 
against possible baiting on the part of the senate should there be no tribunus plebis ready 
for intercession. This measure seems, however, to fit better in the wake of the murder of 
Tiberius Gracchus when the senate did rule a series of extraordinary court trials to be 
held against his advocates, thus reaching out for this long unused measure in political 
struggle.56 As for Gaius Gracchus, it is known that the first thing he did was to pass the law 
prohibiting the summoning of extraordinary courts otherwise than by ruling of the pop-
ular assembly; this was his answer to the attacks on the advocates of Tiberius Gracchus.57 
With this law adopted, it would have been useless to introduce provocatio against extraor-
dinary trial courts. Consequently, the most appropriate time for such a project must be 
132–122 BCE, and it might be the Tiberius’ supporters, who considered it. 
penalty in the 12 Tables (namely, perjury, purchasing of votes and of court decision). But Mommsen’s inter-
pretation lacks parallels. 
54 For the 2nd c. BCE cf. Polyb. 6, 16, 1–2: “The senate … cannot carry out inquiries into the most grave 
and important offences against the state, which are punishable with death, and their correction, unless the 
senatus consultum is confirmed by the people” (Trans. Paton 1979). See Walbank 1957, 690–691. Polybius 
may have in mind only the quaestiones, which took place in Rome and investigated the crimes of the Roman 
citizens. For investigating the crimes of Italics the senate did not need a decision of the people (cf. Polyb. 6, 13, 
4 and 7; Walbank 1957, 679–680). Polybius could mean the review of the commission’s judgment by the people 
or the right of appeal against it. But such a view would not fit the evidence, on which see Ungern-Sternberg 
1970, 29–38. Polybius could also have in mind not a custom, but the lex Sempronia of the 123 BCE: as Walbank, 
1972, 11–13 suggests, in 118 BCE he could still be working on his “History”. I am very grateful for this remark 
to A. Verlinsky. Whether the approval of the people was needed in the concrete case or not may have depended 
both on the position of tribuni plebis and of the senate. Cf. e.g. Liv. 4, 50–51: the tribunes vetoed the SC, and 
the senate asked them for a plebiscite. The passage is the only source on the case, which reports this fact (see 
Broughton 1951, 75), but if Livy invented it, he might have used a well-known scheme. 
55 In the 2nd c. BCE the “political” crimes could be investigated only after the voting of the people. See 
literature quoted in n. 55. In the earlier time the senate might need no approval of the people (Kunkel 1963, 
732), but it’s rather difficult to cite any sources. The only attested case concerning a “political” crime might be 
the consular investigation of coitiones, which was ordered by the senate after resignation of the dictator C. Mae-
nius (314 BCE), who had begun the inquiry. See Liv. 9, 26 and Oakley 1998, 319–320 (coitiones); Oakley 2005, 
318–322 about C. Maenius. Kunkel 1963, 732 suggests convincingly that also the quaestio caedis Postumianae 
of the 413 BCE might be appointed not by the plebs (Liv. 4, 51), but by the senate. Cf. Ogilvie 1965, 611–612. 
56 See Ungern-Sternberg 1970, 43. 
57 I am convinced by Ungern-Sternberg 1970, 50–54 concerning the content of the law. See Kuznetso-
va 2017, 284 for the discussion of the sources.
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Thus, Plutarch’s testimony can be interpreted in two ways. If the Gracchan bill con-
cerned the senatorial quaestiones extraordinariae, it could have been discussed as a neces-
sary measure against political prosecution, and such a measure could have been especially 
appealing after a series of persecutions of the advocates of Tiberius Gracchus. There is noth-
ing in this reform that is exceptional or reprehensible. In any case, even if the provocatio was 
normally directed against coercitio, there is a slim chance that a speeded court procedure in 
such trials made provocatio against them natural even from the legal viewpoint.58 In Plutarch 
we witness a description of a bill distorted beyond recognition (the question remains wheth-
er it was intended59) and the whole idea is not very convincingly attributed to Tiberius.
The second possibility is that the alleged bill dealt with some other court. In this case 
it is easier to criticize this law, than to put forward arguments in its favour: it is difficult to 
think of beneficent consequences it could have had; apart from the reference to the civic 
value of the right for provocatio, it is hardly possible to justify this law as such. As we have 
seen, provocatio in murder trials could be attractive for common people, if they were not 
aware of possible consequences of such a law. Yet more likely is the possibility that the bill 
was ascribed to Tiberius Gracchus by a source hostile to Gracchi. To introduce the provo-
catio was, in fact, in most cases useless and even dangerous: it could harm the interests of 
the various strata of society and give the senate a good argument in propaganda. Hence, it 
is very probable that the author of this testimony aimed at representing Tiberius Gracchus 
as cunning and unprincipled demagogue, caring not if there could be point in the alleged 
bill and what content it could have.
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